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# EVALUATING FLAG STATE PERFORMANCE

## Part I: Background

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Prepared for the High Seas Task Force by  
OceanLaw Information and Consultancy Services



**High Seas Task Force  
OceanLaw Information and Consultancy Services**

## **EVALUATING FLAG STATE PERFORMANCE**

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## Preface

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This document has been prepared for the Ministerially-led Task Force on IUU Fishing on the High Seas by OceanLaw Information and Consultancy Services Ltd.

The High Seas Task Force represents an attempt by a small group of fisheries ministers and directors-general of international conservation organizations to take the lead in actively promoting practical solutions to the problem of IUU fishing on the high seas. The aim was to provide political leadership to drive forward much needed practical initiatives that could be implemented immediately. The solutions proposed are designed to complement international multilateral initiatives on IUU fishing.

Each of the major proposals developed by the Task Force is intended to have one or both of the following effects:

- It will enhance enforcement, sharply increasing the risk of exposure of IUU operations and the potential for successful prohibition
- It will make IUU operations less profitable, increasing the capital and operating costs and reducing the revenues from IUU fishing

Each measure is thus designed in some way to **expose** IUU fishing activities, **deter** them and **improve enforcement** against those responsible.

Task Force members recognize that responsible flag state and port state behaviour is central to strong deterrence of IUU fishing. To help tackle the problem of flag states that fail to live up to their international obligations, *Proposal 5* (out of a total of 9 proposals) is to develop a preliminary set of guidelines on flag state performance.

This document is designed to inform and support *Proposal 5*. It represents a suggested model, and preliminary analysis, which might serve as the basis for a long-standing set of guidelines on flag State performance. The general aim determined by the Task Force was to establish an objective list of the responsibilities that those involved in the high seas fishing industry, including States, RFMOs, fishers and consumers might reasonably expect of flag States in respect of their fishing vessels. This list was then to form the basis for criteria for evaluating the performance of individual flag States. This model selects certain criteria, describes their rationale and provides a basic, and tentative, evaluation against those criteria for more than 150 coastal / flag States.

## **1 Introduction**

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Increasing attention is being paid by the fishing industry, NGOs, commentators, politicians and other stakeholders to the role of the flag State in combating IUU fishing on the high seas. In recent years, there has been considerable international effort both to improve the management of high seas fisheries in general and to develop means to combat IUU fishing, not least in the adoption of global instruments such as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the related International Plans of Action. Attention is now increasingly directed, however, towards implementation of these (and other) instruments by RFMOs and their (flag State) members and by flag States individually.

Attention is often most closely focussed on those States which allow fishing vessels to be registered in their territories and to fly their flags without taking any of the basic steps necessary to control the fishing activities of those vessels (the so-called "flag of convenience" countries). However, the problem is clearly much wider than that as even those States which are more normally thought of as 'responsible' fishing States often do not participate fully in the relevant international processes and/or do not adequately implement measures domestically. There is a general perception that many flag States are not fulfilling their responsibilities effectively and that this lack of control is a primary cause of IUU fishing.

All flag States can achieve greater control over their fishing vessels. The tools for them to do so are widely available in current international instruments. To achieve greater control, however, a State must have the political will to do so. These guidelines highlight some of the most basic functions and responsibilities of the flag State and evaluate the performance of individual States against those indicators. In doing so, it is hoped that the guidelines will encourage States to implement their responsibilities more effectively.

## **2 Purpose, Scope and Layout**

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This document elaborates a suggested model for the development of long-standing guidelines on flag State performance and provides a basic, and tentative, evaluation against those criteria for more than 150 coastal / flag States. It is not designed as a definitive evaluation of flag State performance, but rather an prototype to promote further discussion, evaluation and development.

The general aim of the guidelines, as conceived by the Task Force, was to establish an objective list of the responsibilities that those involved in the high seas fishing industry, including States, regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), fishers and consumers might reasonably expect of flag States in respect of their fishing vessels. This list was then to form the basis for criteria for evaluating the performance of individual flag States. The guidelines were to seek to elaborate a set of basic criteria by which the most fundamental elements of flag State performance could be assessed with two main purposes:

- (1) to evaluate the performance of individual flag States against a range of basic indicators relevant to IUU fishing on the high seas; and
- (2) to give publicity to those that fall short of desirable standards.

The guidelines developed in this document (and, conceivably, any future guidelines) are not intended to be (and are not capable of) a definitive or exhaustive evaluation of the actions of flag States. They are illustrative and recommendatory in nature, and seek simply to indicate possible performance in a number of pre-defined and very general indicators.

### **Scope**

All coastal States are included in the assessment. It is recognized that not all coastal States will necessarily be flag States with high seas interests, but it is considered that *most* coastal States will have some interest in high seas fisheries, either because of a high seas fishing fleet or as a coastal State in a region with shared (high seas) resources.

The evaluation itself is based around three broad categories of flag State function: (A) participation in global fisheries agreements; (B) participation in regional fisheries agreements and organizations; and (C) domestic implementation and regulation. Within each category a number of general criteria are identified, which are designed to represent the most basic functions and responsibilities of a flag State. For each criterion, performance is assessed by indicating whether or not there is "possible negative performance" by the flag State and the results are presented in tabular form at the end of the guidelines.

This scope of research and analysis was subject to a number of limitations. In particular, research was limited to information accessible in the (international) public domain, which in turn was limited by language and other accessibility constraints. Further, the need for analysis to be objective and simple means that only a basic picture can be presented. Nevertheless, within these constraints, criteria are presented and evaluated which are able broadly to indicate performance against a range of the most important flag State functions.

## **Layout**

These guidelines consist of three parts.

Part I, the current document, contains introductory guidance and outlines the background and scope of the guidelines, and describes the criteria used in the analysis.

Part II presents the results of the analysis in table form. Against each assessment criterion, possible negative performance by a coastal State is indicated by means of a black dot.

Part III presents the detailed results of the research which contributed to the evaluation, along with the methodology used to conduct the research, and may be read in conjunction with either Part I or Part II.

[Parts I and II are published together as a single document. Part III is not published as part of the final report, but is available separately at [www.high-seas.org](http://www.high-seas.org) / [www.oceanlaw.net](http://www.oceanlaw.net)].

### 3 The Role of the Flag State

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It is a long-established right of every State to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas, subject only to a general requirement to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters, and as a general proposition the flag State has primary responsibility under international law for controlling the fishing activities of its vessels. Under international law (as set out in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention), the flag State has exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas over vessels flying its flag, subject only to certain narrowly defined situations of extraordinary jurisdiction, including piracy, terrorism, illicit traffic in narcotics and unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas.

In recent years, some international fisheries agreements have attempted to limit the exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction by giving States other than the flag State the right to take action with respect to fishing vessels on the high seas (provided both States concerned are parties to the fisheries agreement). Nothing, however, in these agreements abrogates the fundamental principle of flag State responsibility since the flag State – in the first place – has to accept these restrictions by becoming a party to the fisheries agreement.

Given that the provisions in an international agreement apply only to a flag State if it is a party to the agreement (the rule in international law known as *pacta sunt servanda*) and given that otherwise the flag State is exclusively responsible for its vessels on the high seas, it becomes apparent that flag States have the primary responsibility for preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing on the high seas. It is the flag State which decides whether or not to participate in international agreements and organizations, or to implement measures, such as those in international agreements or in other instruments such as the IPOA-IUU, to deter IUU fishing, and it is for the flag State to exercise jurisdiction and control over its vessels. The failure of many flag States to exercise this responsibility effectively or at all is well-documented and widely recognized. Indeed, lack of effective flag State control has been cited as the primary cause of IUU fishing.\* Many States allow fishing vessels to be registered in their territories and to fly their flags without taking any of the basic steps necessary to control the fishing activities of those vessels; and even those States which are more normally thought of as 'responsible' fishing States often do not fully comply with international norms and standards concerning the control of IUU fishing.

All flag States, therefore, can achieve greater control over their fishing vessels. The tools for them to do so are widely available in current international instruments, in particular: the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement, regional fisheries agreements, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing. To achieve greater control, however, a State must have the political will to do so. These guidelines are designed in part to encourage flag States to implement better controls.

As a first step, flag States should ratify the relevant international instruments, including those just mentioned, that embody the modern norms relating to flag State responsibility. However, there are a number of other basic steps a responsible flag State would also be expected to take, including, among others: full and effective participation in international fisheries organizations, and implementation of the measures agreed by them; adoption of National Plans of Action on IUU fishing and the carrying out of the actions identified in such plans; and the effective implementation of national measures and systems for the regulation (e.g. authorization), surveillance and control of fishing vessels on the high seas. These guidelines take these basic actions as essential indicators of responsible fishing, and seek to evaluate the performance of flag States against such indicators.

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\* K. Bray. 2000. *A global review of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing*. Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Sydney, Australia, 15-19 May 2000.

## **4 Evaluating Flag State Performance**

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For the purposes of assessment, these guidelines consider flag State performance in three broad categories:

- [A] participation in global fisheries agreements;
- [B] participation in regional fisheries agreements and organizations; and
- [C] domestic implementation and regulation.

Within each category a number of basic indicators of performance are elaborated. The following sections describe these indicators and outline how assessment is made against them. Further detail on the methodology is available in Part III.

### **[A] Participation in global fisheries agreements**

Participation in international fisheries agreements is an important first step for responsible flag States. Although participation in an agreement does not necessarily guarantee compliance by the flag State with the provisions of that agreement, the act of ratification itself is an important political statement. It also brings the flag State into a system of reciprocal obligations with other States which are also seeking to bring about improved fisheries governance. This section considers the three major global agreements related to fisheries (the UN Law of the Sea Convention, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Compliance Agreement) and global agreements concerned with fishing vessel safety.

#### **1 Ratification of or accession to the Law of the Sea Convention**

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("LOSC") is the principal international convention dealing with matters related to ocean use. It's provisions on fisheries provide the general framework for the international law of fisheries, codifying long-standing principles such as the freedom of fishing, the primacy of flag State jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas and setting out general duties to cooperate in the conservation and management of living marine resources. It also provides the framework for all other agreements concerning fisheries, which on the whole have been designed to be consistent with the Convention. Given the extensive scope of the LOSC, it is recognized that there may be reasons unconnected with fisheries that lead a particular State to decide not to ratify the Convention. Nevertheless, it is considered that full participation in the Convention should be encouraged as a means to improve international fisheries governance.

#### **2 Ratification of or accession to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement**

The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement ("UNFSA") is the most important international agreement governing high seas fisheries and ratification of or accession to it must be regarded as one of the most fundamental steps a flag State can take towards responsible performance. UNFSA has much more extensive provisions than LOSC on the duties of flag States, as well as a great many other rules expanding on those of LOSC, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of fisheries for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The Agreement also contains a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism which extends beyond LOSC, in particular that it also applies, as amongst parties to it, to disputes arising in other fisheries agreements where no mechanisms exist under such agreements.

#### **3 Acceptance of the FAO Compliance Agreement**

Like UNFSA, the FAO Compliance Agreement is an agreement of fundamental importance to high seas fisheries. There is some degree of overlap between this Agreement and UNFSA, both of which focus extensively on flag State responsibilities on the high seas, although the

Compliance Agreement also contains a number of unique provisions, particularly relating to data collection. Importantly, the provisions of the Compliance Agreement apply to all high seas stocks, including discrete stocks not covered by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.

#### **4 Ratification of or accession to maritime safety agreements**

There are a number of international agreements which concern the safety of fishing vessels and the welfare of fishing crews. Of these, two agreements, both elaborated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, are of particular importance: the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel; and the International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels. Participation in these Conventions should be encouraged as a function of responsible flag State action. (A number of other agreements, concerned with crew welfare and elaborated under the International Labour Organization, are not considered here as they are considered "outdated" by the parent organization).

### **[B] Participation in regional fisheries agreements and organizations**

Whilst ratification of the major global treaties is an important indicator of flag State performance, it is clearly not in itself sufficient: a flag State must also implement the obligations contained in those treaties effectively, in particular by ratifying relevant regional agreements (which seek to implement the global agreements) and by participating in relevant regional fisheries agreements. This is not in itself sufficient, of course, since the flag State must also comply with and implement the measures adopted by those regional organizations.

#### **1 Ratification of relevant regional fisheries agreements**

Both LOSC and UNFSA envisage cooperation between States in the conservation and management of high seas fish stocks taking place primarily at the regional level, through international fisheries agreements, arrangements and organizations. The most basic step towards this is ratification of relevant regional treaties. Indeed, under UNFSA any State which has a "real interest" in a fishery must join the relevant organization (or cooperate with it) and such participation is a pre-condition, under the Agreement, to access to the resources for which the organization is responsible.

These guidelines identify those States which have a "real interest" in fisheries governed by a regional fisheries agreement and take possible negative performance to exist where (in at least one instance) a State with such an interest has not ratified or acceded to that agreement. In order to identify States having a "real interest" in particular fisheries, the guidelines are led by the determinations of the States parties and RFMOs themselves. Thus, in addition to the parties themselves, States considered to have an interest include any cooperating non-parties identified by the contracting parties/members; any non-cooperating non-parties identified by the contracting parties/members; and any other flag States identified by the contracting parties/members as having vessels fishing within the agreement's area of competence (e.g. vessels contained on an IUU 'black list').

#### **2 Membership of relevant RFMOs or participation as a cooperating non-member**

Along with ratification of relevant treaties, membership of relevant RFMOs or participation in such organizations as a cooperating non-member is the most basic method by which a flag State can implement its obligations to cooperate. Of course, in most cases a flag State which is a party to a regional agreement will be a member of the organization established by that agreement (and so a degree of overlap with B1 is inevitable). However, a number of cases may be distinguished, justifying separate evaluation. First, some RFMOs are created not by treaty but by a resolution of another organization, such as FAO Article VI bodies (which include, for example, SWIOFC, CECAF and WECAFC); and, conversely, some agreements do

not establish a regional organization: a separate evaluation thus catches these situations. Second, the evaluation in this section includes cooperating non-contracting parties/members, recognizing – whilst not equivalent to formal participation in the agreement itself – the responsible discharge of flag State duties by non-members cooperating with RFMOs. Finally, while some treaties automatically make their parties members of the RFMO they create, there are exceptions, including NAFO and CCAMLR.

The guidelines identify those States which have a “real interest” in fisheries governed by a regional fisheries organization (as above) and take possible negative performance to exist where (in at least one instance) a State with such an interest is not a member or a cooperating non-member of that organization.

### **3 Compliance with RFMO measures**

It is clear that membership of, or formal cooperation with, RFMOs is not in itself sufficient. In order for a flag State to fully meet its responsibilities to other users of high seas fisheries, it must also implement the measures agreed within RFMOs.

Such measures might include, *inter alia*: transposition and enforcement of quotas and other RFMO conservation measures; fulfilling the catch, effort and other data reporting requirements of RFMOs; participation in RFMO-mandated observer programmes, inspection schemes or other monitoring, control and surveillance measures; or participation in catch documentation schemes either as a member of the RFMO or, where the RFMO permits (CCAMLR, for example), as a non-member.

Again, the guidelines rely on determinations made by the RFMOs themselves. Thus, possible negative performance will be indicated where, in at least one instance, the flag State has been subject to a specific citation by a RFMO for failure to implement, comply with or enforce regulations established by the organization.

## **[C] Domestic implementation and regulation**

The final area in which these guidelines evaluation flag State performance is in domestic implementation and regulation. There are a wide-range of actions a flag State might be expected to take: these guidelines focus on a small number of fundamental actions, which might be considered amongst the more fundamental obligations relating to preventing IUU fishing on the high seas. They include: adoption of a NPOA-IUU; maintenance of national records of fishing vessels; requirement for the standardized marking of fishing vessels; and a system of high seas fisheries regulation.

### **1 Adoption of a NPOA-IUU**

As an action called for by the FAO (see, specifically, paras. 25-27 of the IPOA-IUU), and thus one to which responsible flag States should accord some priority, a National Plan of Action against IUU Fishing (NPOA-IUU) is a means whereby a flag State can bring to the attention of both its fishing fleet and the general public the necessity for high seas fishing to be conducted only within RFMO frameworks, develop effective domestic policy to prevent and deter IUU fishing and achieve the necessary coordinated action of its internal regulatory organs to ensure that these objectives occur.

### **2 Maintenance of a national record of fishing vessels and its availability to the FAO and/or RFMOs**

As required by Articles IV and VI of the FAO Compliance Agreement and other instruments, and not least as an expression of the principle of the international responsibility of the flag State for the activities (both lawful and unlawful) of its vessels and nationals on the high seas

commons, it is suggested that a responsible flag State should as a matter of course keep the international community regularly informed, though the FAO and/or RFMOs, about the identity of those it has licensed or authorized to fish on the high seas.

As an ultimate objective, this information should form part of a detailed and publicly accessible national record of all fishing vessels. Work at a global level on developing standards for such records is still in progress, however, and very few States have developed comprehensive national records. Nevertheless, there is still much a flag State can do, including contributing records of fishing vessels to RFMOs, where such information is collected by the organization, and – where appropriate – contributing to the FAO High Seas Vessels Authorization Record (HSVAR), established pursuant to the FAO Compliance Agreement. Possible negative performance will be taken to exist where a flag State does not contribute to the HSVAR database or, where it has a real interest, as determined above, does not provide record information to the appropriate RFMO.

### **3 Requirement for the standardized marking of fishing vessels**

Standardized marking of fishing vessels aids monitoring, control and enforcement by enabling the easy identification of fishing vessels at sea or in port. It is a basic technical provision which a flag State could be expected to meet with relatively little difficulty.

### **4 System of fisheries regulation on the high seas, including a prohibition on fishing on the high seas without licence/authorization**

As a minimum, responsible flag States should not claim they were unable to exercise control over their vessels or nationals fishing on the high seas for lack of domestic legislation. This is an application of one of the most basic principles of international law: that a State may not plead its domestic law as an excuse for failure to comply with its international obligations. The requirement of a positive act of licensing or authorization ensures at least some level of consciousness by the flag State of the level of fishing pressure it exerts on the high seas, and engenders awareness that the State is internationally responsible for the fishing activities on the high seas by a vessel it flags, i.e. that the freedom of fishing carries with it responsibilities.

Assessment of this criterion does not involve a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of high seas fisheries regulation by the flag State. For the purposes of assessment, it is considered sufficient if the flag State has a formal system (i.e. at least in part provided for in law or administratively) for regulating fishing on the high seas, which must as a minimum include licensing/authorization requirements. (Possible negative performance will be taken to exist where there is no such system).

**Produced for the High Seas Task Force  
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These guidelines have been developed using the best information available but they are intended for guidance only. No warranties of any kind are made as to the information contained herein and no responsibility is accepted by any firm, corporation or organization who or which has been in any way concerned with the furnishing of data, the compilation, publication, production or supply of this guidance, for the accuracy of any information or advice contained within, or for any omission or for any consequences whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from use of these guidelines or from compliance with or adoption of guidance contained therein. The guidelines are to be used at the user's own risk.

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# **EVALUATING FLAG STATE PERFORMANCE**

## **Part II: Flag State Performance Table**

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## Flag State Performance Table

This table summarizes factual information available in the public domain that may be helpful in assessing the performance of flag States. It forms part of the report *Evaluating Flag State Performance*, prepared by OceanLaw Information and Consultancy Services for the High Seas Task Force ([www.high-seas.org](http://www.high-seas.org)) and should be read in conjunction with Part I (guidelines) and Part III (research and methodology). The full report is accessible at [www].

Possible negative performance indicators are shown as black dots. The information provided below is intended to be illustrative only, and this document has been developed as guidance. The collection of data used to compile the table is subject to the normal constraints and limitations of public information use and the information the table provides should be used with care. Indicators, whether used individually or collectively, may not necessarily produce an accurate measurement of performance and users must exercise their own judgment when using the table.

### Flag State Performance

	Global agreements				Regional agreements			Domestic implementation			
	UNCLOS	UNFSA	FAOCA	Maritime safety agreements	Regional fisheries agreements	Membership of RFMOs	Compliance	NPOA-IUU	National record of fishing vessels	Marking of fishing vessels	High seas fisheries regulation
Albania		■		■				■	■	■	
Algeria		■	■	■			■	■	■	■	
Angola		■	■	■	■			■	■		
Antigua & Barbuda		■		■				■	■		■
Argentina		■		■				■	■	■	
Australia				■					■		
Bahamas			■	■				■	■	■	■
Bahrain		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Bangladesh		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Barbados			■	■			■	■	■	■	■
Belgium			■	■				■	■	■	
Belize				■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Benin		■		■				■	■	■	■
Bosnia & Herzegovina		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Brazil			■	■			■	■	■	■	
Brunei Darussalam		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Bulgaria		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Cambodia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Cameroon		■	■	■	■			■	■	■	
Canada				■	■		■			■	
Cape Verde		■	■	■				■	■	■	
Chile		■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
China		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Colombia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■
Comoros		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Congo	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■
Congo, Dem. Rep. of		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Cook Islands			■	■				■	■	■	■
Costa Rica			■	■		■	■	■	■	■	
Côte d'Ivoire		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Croatia		■	■	■				■	■	■	
Cuba		■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■



Nauru			■	■				■		■	
Netherlands			■	■			■	■	■	■	
New Zealand				■						■	
Nicaragua		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Nigeria		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Niue	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Norway				■				■		■	
Oman		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Pakistan		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Palau		■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■
Panama		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Papua New Guinea			■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■
Peru	■	■		■				■	■	■	■
Philippines		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Poland		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Portugal			■	■			■	■	■	■	
Qatar		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Romania		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Russian Federation			■	■			■	■	■	■	
Saint Kitts and Nevis		■		■				■	■	■	■
Saint Lucia				■				■	■	■	■
Saint Vincent & Gren.		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Samoa			■	■				■	■	■	■
São Tomé and Príncipe		■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■
Saudi Arabia		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Senegal			■	■	■			■		■	■
Serbia and Montenegro		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Seychelles			■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sierra Leone		■	■	■	■	■	■			■	■
Singapore		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovenia		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Solomon Islands			■	■				■		■	■
Somalia		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
South Africa			■	■	■			■	■	■	■
Spain			■	■	■	■	■			■	■
Sri Lanka			■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■
Sudan		■	■	■				■		■	■
Suriname		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Sweden				■					■	■	
Syrian Arab Republic	■	■		■					■	■	■
Tanzania, U. Rep. of		■		■				■	■	■	■
Thailand	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Timor-Leste	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Togo		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tonga			■	■				■		■	■
Trinidad and Tobago		■	■	■			■	■		■	■
Tunisia		■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■
Turkey	■	■	■	■			■		■	■	■
Tuvalu		■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Ukraine			■	■				■	■	■	■
United Arab Emirates	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
United Kingdom			■	■	■				■	■	
United States of America	■			■	■	■	■			■	■
Uruguay				■			■	■	■	■	■
Vanuatu		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Venezuela	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Vietnam		■	■	■				■		■	■
Yemen	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
<i>European Community</i>				■	■		■		■	■	■
<i>Taiwan</i>	-	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■

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